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ABSTRACT
Roles are convenient and powerful concept for facilitating access to distributed systems and enforcing access management 
polices. RBAC is one the most widely used role engineering models in enterprises. Several threats arise due to insecure and 
inefficient design of roles when social and interaction dynamics in an organizational setting are ignored. Activity theory is 
one of the most applied and researched theories in context of understanding human actions, interactions with environments 
and dynamics against different social entities. The paper, first, presents overview of role-engineering and activity theory. 
Then the paper presents different methods in which activity theory can be applied for efficient and secure role-engineering 
processes. A case study, carried out at a US-based midsize financial institution, is also presented to demonstrate 1) how 
traditional role-engineering processes give way to threats and 2) how using activity theory models (2 used in this paper) can 
mitigate risks in role-engineering process.
Keywords: Activity Theory, Role engineering, Risk Management, RBAC, case study
INTRODUCTION
Roles are convenient and powerful concept for facilitating access to distributed systems and enforcing access 
management polices. Although the concept of a role has been used by researchers (Biddle and Thomas, 1979; Ferraiolo and 
Kuhn, 1992; Schaad at. Al, 2001) for many years, the establishment of the RBAC96 model (Sandhu et al, 1996) and 
subsequent variants of the RBAC models have provided the most impetus to the research area of access control models. 
Many organizations are moving to role based access control. The process of developing an RBAC structure for an 
organization has become known as "role engineering". Role engineering can be a complex undertaking. For example, in 
implementing RBAC for a large European bank with over 50,000 employees and 1,400 branches serving more than 6 million 
customers, approximately 1,300 roles were discovered (RBAC Standard, 2008). Role engineering originated from the need 
to create a set of roles that encapsulates the functionalities and responsibilities of a working enterprise (Coyne, 1995). The
intuitive method of identifying roles is by elicitation; extraction from job functionalities, scenarios and processes (Neumann 
and Strembeck, 2002; Roeckle et al, 2000). 
Activity Theory seeks to explain social and cultural work practices by relating them to the cultural and historic 
context in which the work activity, which is the basic unit for analysis, is taking place. Using activity theory, user needs are 
understood both historically and as something to be constructed collaboratively. Activity theory shares the idea, with other 
contemporary theories, that a hierarchical analysis of human action is valuable with means and ends analysis, task analysis 
alike (Bertelsen and Bodkaer, 2003). Thus the conceptual framework of Activity theory has been seen as a way of providing 
a means of analyzing the actions and interactions with artifacts within a historical and cultural context (Rogers, 2004). 
Activity Theory is thus seen as being useful to design interfaces and systems that take into account the context of use and 
thus can play an important role in better user experiences. Activity theory has been used for a framework to enhance the 
business value of a firm’s resources. Given the unique offerings of activity theory, it can be successfully applied for 
understanding users, roles and privileges to design secure role-engineering processes. 
The paper is organized as follows: Next Section presents background and motivation for this paper, specifically why 
Activity theory is used to guide role-engineering tasks. Section on preliminaries presents concepts and definitions in form of 
preliminaries that are needed to understand the role engineering process when analyzed using principles and concepts of 
activity theory. Section on Activity Guided Role Engineering presents overview of RBAC model adapted to include activity 
theory’s system components and Activity theory model adapted to show RBAC components. Following Section presents a 
real-world analysis of role engineering process from an activity theory perspective. This example is based on information 
gathered through semi-structured interviews and round table discussions conducted with 2 application managers and 4 
information security specialists at a mid-sized US-based financial institution. The paper concludes with conclusions and brief 
discussion on future work.
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BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
Activity theory offers the options for understanding use and system design for computer applications as well as other 
parts of the work activity are constantly reconstructed to meet the dynamic demands of any organization. An explicit 
awareness of these hidden trends may change our way of doing design (Floyd, 1987). Researchers (Mwanza 2001; Korpela, 
Soriyan et al., 2000) have proposed AT-based methodologies for software development. Several other disciplines have used 
Activity Theory to understand their processes and constructs. However, note that due to origins and wide applications of it in 
social and psychological areas, activity theory is vastly under utilized in information security areas.
 As is evident from the literature review that role engineering is an increasingly critical and vital process at any 
organization from both functionality and security viewpoints. It is also revealed through literature review that activity theory 
has not been used, thus far, to analyze and understand role-engineering process to design effective and secure roles within an 
organization. With Activity theory’s immense benefits, I analyze role-engineering process and principles to unravel some of 
the human and social facets that are not evident from traditional role engineering frameworks. 
PRELIMINARIES
RBAC 
With continuously growing numbers of applications, enterprises face the problem of efficiently managing the 
assignment of access permissions to their users. In an information system, data protection against improper disclosure or 
modification is an important requirement. The access control regulates what a user can do directly and what the programs 
executed on behalf of the user is allowed to do.  There are standard models (RBAC96 (Sandhu et al, 1996), NIST2001 (IT 
2004)) and active research on its extensions (Sandhu et al, 1996, Sandhu et al, 1997; Kern 2002). Figure 1 shows Sanshu’s 
RBAC96. Since the early 1990s, Role-Based Access Control has become more popular, which is an interesting alternative to 
the traditional access-control models, like MAC (Mandatory Access Control) or DAC (Discretionary Access Control) 
(Ferraiolo and Kuhn, 1992). Mainly enterprises with many users and high security demands like banking companies are now 
considering RBAC and role concepts, and therefore facing the problem of how to define roles. Role-based access control 
(RBAC) has been adopted successfully by a variety of commercial systems. As a result, RBAC has become the norm in many 
of today’s organizations for enforcing security. Basically, a role is nothing but a set of permissions. Roles represent 
organizational agents that perform certain job functions within the organization. Users, in turn, are assigned appropriate roles 
based on their qualifications (Sandhu et al, 1996, Ferraiolo et al, 2001). However, one of the major challenges in 
implementing RBAC is to define a complete and correct set of roles. This process, known as role engineering (Coyne, 1995), 
has been identified as one of the costliest components in realizing RBAC (Gallagher , 2002). 
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Role Engineering
Role engineering originated from the need to create a set of roles that encapsulates the functionalities and 
responsibilities of a working enterprise (Coyne, 1995). Essentially, role engineering is the process of defining roles and 
assigning permissions to them. Role engineering for role-based access control (RBAC) is the process of defining roles, 
permissions, constraints and role-hierarchies (Coyne, 1996). The intuitive method of identifying roles is by elicitation; 
extraction from job functionalities, scenarios and processes (Neumann and Strembeck, 2002; Roeckle et al, 2000). Initial 
approaches used use cases to group actions performed in a particular procedure into a role (Fernandez and Hawkins, 1997).  
The definition of a role concept (role engineering) is a difficult task traditionally performed via interviews and workshops. 
Role engineering is a tedious, error-prone and politically difficult task. Once role definitions are established, there is latency 
and efforts to gain more privileges per job demands. So, people are hesitant to specify roles and reluctant to co-operate. 
There are generally two approaches to role engineering (Epstein and Sandhu, 2001): Either working top-down from 
an initial description to roles and permissions or else aggregating permissions bottom-up into roles. The first approach starts 
with business process definitions or scenarios, extracts role candidates from these descriptions, and then transforms them into 
an enterprise role concept (Roeckle, 2000; Roeckle et al, 2000). The roles are then fitted with the necessary permissions. This 
approach is time-consuming and error-prone. It also requires early co-operation of employees and/or experts and is harder to 
support with a tool: the necessary knowledge is in people’s minds and has to be externalized first. The second approach starts 
bottom-up by analyzing artifacts of roles (Kuhlmann et al, 2003) and then transforms and aggregates them into the roles 
themselves. The idea here is that roles are already implicitly in use (Sandhu et al, 1996) and have to be identified rather than 
defined. Therefore, relying solely on a top-down approach in most cases is not viable, although some case studies (Schaad et 
al, 2001) indicate that it has been done successfully by some organizations (though at a high cost). In contrast, since 
organizations do not exist in a vacuum, the bottom-up approach utilizes the existing permission assignments to formulate 
roles. Starting from the existing permissions before RBAC is implemented, the bottom-up approach aggregates these into 
roles. It may also be advantageous to use a mixture of the top-down and the bottom- up approaches to conduct role 
engineering. While the top-down model is likely to ignore the existing permissions, a bottom-up model may not consider 
business functions of an organization (Kern et al, 2002). However, the bottom-up approach excels in the fact that much of the 
role engineering process can be automated. Role mining can be used as a tool, in conjunction with a top-down approach, to 
identify potential or candidate roles which can then be examined to determine if they are appropriate given existing functions 
and business processes.
Role: Concept and Issues
Roles can be differentiated between functional and organizational roles. Functional roles are based on business 
functions within a company. Organizational roles correspond to the hierarchical organization in a company in terms of 
internal structures. Functional roles, in contrast to organizational roles, are robust against organizational restructuring since 
business tasks are often not embedded in organizational structures. The research of roles to set up in an organization is a 
complex task because of poor formalization of functional roles. Often, this is a cooperative process where various authorities 
from different disciplines understand the semantics of business processes of one another and then incorporate them in the 
form of roles. Since there could be often dozens of business processes, tens of thousands of users and millions of 
authorizations, this is rather a difficult task. Moreover, the role concept is an abstract approach and does not tune with 
physical entity or object. Role engineering has been defined as the process of defining roles, permissions, role hierarchies, 
constraints and assigning the permissions to the roles (Coyne, 1996). In order to explain the determination of roles and/or the 
research of their associated permissions, many concepts were proposed. Fernandez and Hawkins (1997) used the‘‘use case” 
formalism to define the permissions associated to a given role. Thomsen et al. (1998) proposed the RBAC-FNE model (Role-
Based Access Control Framework for Network Enterprises) based on seven layers that may be exploited by various users (i.e. 
application developer or system administrator). In his approach, Epstein and Sandhu (2001) proposed to determine the roles 
and their associated permissions starting from an extension of the RBAC model which includes three new concepts between 
roles and permissions: jobs, work patterns and tasks. Neumann and Strembeck (2002) proposed to determine functional roles 
(and their associated permissions) of an enterprise starting from the scenarios, where each role is depicted using a collection 
of scenarios and each scenario is associated with a set of particular access operations. He and Antn (2003) describe a goal-
driven role engineering process. 
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Activity Theory
Activity theory originated from the works of several Russian scholars. Vygotsky adapted Marx’s political theory 
regarding collective exchanges and material production to capture the co-evolutionary process individuals encounter with 
their environment while learning to engage in shared activities (Stetsenko, 2005). Activity theory has evolved through 2 more 
generations of research (Engeström 1999). The second generation overcame the limitation of Vygotsky’s work which was 
that the unit of analysis remained individually focused. The third generation was popularized by Engeström (1999), which is 
concerned with the process of social transformation and incorporates the structure of the social world and aims to understand 
dialogues, multiple perspectives and networks of interacting activity systems.
Activity Theory provides a set of basic principles to capture a broader conceptual framework with which to 
understand the goal oriented, socially and culturally influenced work practices of humans using computers. Human activities 
are driven by human needs in order to achieve certain purposes. The activity in question is usually mediated by tools and this 
concept of mediation of activity using artifacts is a central theme of this theory. Most of human activities are collective ones 
taking place in rich communal and social 
environments. A systemic model (Figure 3), 
proposed by Engeström (1987), is used to explain 
collective activities and cooperative work. An 
activity is undertaken by a human agent (subject) 
who is motivated toward the solution of a problem 
or purpose (object), and mediated by tools 
(artifacts) in collaboration with others 
(community). The structure of the activity is 
shaped and constrained by cultural factors 
including conventions (rules) and social divisions 
(division of labor) within the context. 
In Engestrom’s original work, activity 
systems included subject, tool, object, rules, 
community, distribution of labor, and outcomes as 
shown in Figure 2. Subjects are participants of activity and tools are resources that subjects use to obtain the object or the 
goal.  Rules can be informal or formal regulations that subjects need to follow while engaging in the activity.  The 
community is group that subjects belong to and division of labor is the shared responsibilities determined by the 
community. Any component of an activity system can bring about tension in the subject’s effort to attain the object. Finally, 
the outcome is the consequence that the subject faces as a result of the activity. Activity systems analysis was developed to
explore and document the sources of tensions in human individual or collective activities. Engestrom (1987) originally 
introduced his model as a tool for participants to understand the complex psychological phenomenon involved in their 
activities and facilitate an iterative learning process. His intention was to help participants identify tensions in their practices 
and develop strategies to overcome them. 
ACTIVITY THEORY GUIDED ROLE ENGINEERING
Activity theory (AT) has its roots in the cultural–historical psychology. It provides a systematic and yet practical 
framework for analyzing work activities and their complex intrinsic relations (Korpela et al, 2002; Engestrom and Miettinen, 
1999).  In AT, the object of analysis is the whole activity system. Single actions relating to a certain organization, occupation, 
individual, or tasks are just a part of the environment in which the overall activity takes place. This clearly distinguishes the 
AT approach from “traditional” process modeling. One individual usually performs an action, whereas the reason for an 
activity to exist is to achieve something that requires a collective. Division of work, mutual rules and various means of 
communication coordinate actors and their actions. The actions need to be directed towards the shared object and the desired 
outcome, although the actors do not necessarily represent the same organizations and actors may even be unaware of each 
other or of their own role in the system (Korpela et al, 2002; Engestrom, 1987). Similar to all systemic entities, activity 
systems have internal and external interactions. Rules, actors, tools, and objects of an activity system are received from 
various other activity systems. In AT, activity is seen as a systemic entity, i.e. there must be a relative correspondence 
between the activity as a whole and its elements. Further, they have a strong role as a means of coordination and 
communication within the activity system (Korpela et al, 2002;Kutti, 1991; Engestrom, 1987). Thus, ICTs are intertwined 
with the very essence of the work itself (Kutti, 1991). It is understandable that ICT has such a fundamental impact on work. 
Using these basic tenets of activity theory, I next propose adapted models for analyzing and understanding role engineering.
Figure 2. Engestrom’s extended Activity System Model. (1997)
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Activity Theory with RBAC
I analyzed Engestrom’s 
extended Activity System Model 
and RBAC model (Sandhu et al, 
1996) and observed similarities 
between the two. Below I present 
Engestrom’s model showing 
different components and 
processes of RBAC model. The 
items in italics and within 
parentheses are different 
components of RBAC that I 
consider while designing roles. 
They are presented next to 
activity theory components that 
they relate to. While engineering 
roles using activity theory the 
system components in box
should be used to uncover RBAC 
components in parentheses.
RBAC with Activity Theory
Figure 4 shows RBAC96 model with corresponding Engestrom’s extended Activity System Model (1997) in grey 
parentheses. This shows individual applicability of specific Activity System Model Element with RBAC component. What 
this translates to is that in designing roles, for any specific RBAC component, more information and further analyzes could 
be carried out using specific activity theory principles as presented in grey next to them.
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REAL-WORLD CASE STUDY: AN EXAMPLE
I carried out a case study at mid-sized US financial institution to further explore how role engineering is performed 
in organizations and how the activity theory principles and concepts can aid managers and designers engineer effective and 
secure roles. There were 6 people at the financial institution who aided us understand their role engineering process. I met 
them to 1) educate them on activity theory and theory behind RBAC though they were not aware of terms used for formal 
RBAC representations. Table-1 shows the appointments and meetings that were schedule with them. Due to space restrictions 
and ensuing work for further research on this and extended case study, I am only presenting partial details here to illustrate 
applicability and relevance of activity theory in role engineering.
The case
Based on discussions with the managers at the financial institution, we collectively came up with a situation where 
role engineering process can utilize activity theory principles to better understand the implications of role engineering 
process. Also, this will aid managers understand and unravel social and community-based facets of environment that are 
ignored in traditional role engineering process. 
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Note on case: In the Figure 5, App1 and App2 are two applications for which the roles are to be engineered. The 
triangles in the section right of applications are application roles. In the subjects’ section, circles are users and ovals represent 
user communities (Comm1-3). Shared communities are the communities that are belonged by same users (Sh-Comm12). 
Only one such community is shown in the figure to keep the case simple. Right most section shows organizational roles 
within the enterprise (Org1 and Org2). These can denote same functional or positional roles in an organization. 
The small cased letters in Figure 5 denote assignments of application roles and organizational roles to users. 
Table 2, below, show assignments with the exact mappings with the users, communities, roles and applications. Third column 
(Emphasis) presents the linkage that is most vital in understanding applicability of activity theory to role engineering for this 
scenario (Figure 5).
The basic principles of Activity Theory (Kaptelinin and Nardi, 1997)
The basic principles of Activity Theory include the hierarchical structure of activity, object-orientedness, 
internalization/externalization, tool mediation, and development. The following are some of the more important principles:
Hierarchical structure of activity (HSA)
The unit of analysis is an activity directed at an object that motivates activity, giving it a specific direction. 
Activities, actions and operations make up the three levels of activity. 
Object-orientedness (OO)
The principle of "object-orientedness" states that human beings live in a reality that is objective in a broad sense: the 
things that constitute this reality have not only the properties that are considered objective according to natural 
sciences but socially/culturally defined properties as well. 
Internalization/externalization (IE)
Activity Theory differentiates between internal and external activities. It emphasizes that internal activities cannot 
be understood if they are studied separately from external activities, because they transform into each other. 
Mediation (MED)
Activity Theory emphasizes that human activity is mediated by tools. Tools are created and transformed during the 
development of the activity itself and carry with them a particular cultural-historical context.
Table 3 below represents different interactions amongst the user assignments (column 2) and how they result in 
various threats to specific component of RBAC (column 3). Column 4 in Table 3 represents Unit of focus or the component 
that is most likely be hit due to that particular interaction of assignments. The last column provides description of the 
interaction.
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Tables 4 and 5 are legend tables for further analyses done understand applicability of activity theory in role engineering as 
presented in Table 6.
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Based on discussions with the managers at the financial institution where this case study was carried out and analyses of the 
case study dynamics, managers consented on applicability of different principles and concepts of Activity Theory, as they 
would apply to role engineering process.  The threat scenario number from table 3 is presented in column 1 in table 6. Table 
6, below, shows which component and consideration in the role engineering process (column 2) would be affected by Threat 
Scenario (Table 3). Next columns in any row (read threat scenario) of the table present Activity theory principles (from both 
Kaptelinin and Nardi, 1997 model and Engestrom’s System Model, 1997) that should be used to further unravel any 
interactions that may arise inefficient and insecure roles. For example, row 3 of the table represents Threat Scenario III 
(arising due to Cross-application roles). For this scenario user-assignment to roles, separation of duties and application role 
hierarchy are the most important components of RBAC that should be closely scrutinized. At the same time, managers at the 
financial institutions, feel that Internalization/externalization (IE) and Object-orientedness (OO) are the principles from
Kaptelinin and Nardi (1997)’s Activity Theory Artifact that can aid in further understanding of the social dynamics within 
organization that can uncover some vital scenarios that should be accounted for in role engineering. Similarly, last column 
shows Activity Theory System Elements, consideration of which will significantly mitigate the risks of insecure role creation 
by analyzing the context of the users and roles (both application and organizational).
CONCLUSION
In the paper I discussed concepts and frameworks of roles, role-engineering and activity theory. Some common 
drawbacks of traditional role-engineering processes were presented. In light of unique insights that activity theory can 
provide in the role-engineering process to enable creation and maintenance of scalable and secure roles, I presented on how 
different components of RBAC model and of activity theory can be brought together for activity theory guided role-
engineering. Then, I presented a case study of two applications from a northeast-US financial institution. With the help of 6 
key people at the bank, we demonstrated how several threats (Table 6) that arise from social-and-community interactions and 
organizational-structure can be revealed using tenets of activity theory. Due to space limitations for AMCIS, I provided brief 
descriptions on the case study. More details on the underpinnings of the case study will be appearing in the updated version 
of this paper for a journal submission. As current and further research, I am in process of getting data from a couple of 
organizations to understand existing role structure and hierarchies and then use activity theory to understand how they can 
improved and also to examine any current threats. In wake of the emergence of roles in organizations and increased threats 
from insiders, it has brought to everyone’s attention to find better ways to improve role-engineering processes. I believe, as is 
also demonstrated in the case study, that activity theory can be very effectively employed to design and engineer secure roles.
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